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"The Right of Control Over the City
Plan: Local Planner Versus the State
Legislature and the Court"

Carlyle W. Hall, Jr.*

The past five years have witnessed an enormous change in the
way in which the legal system relates to the local land use planning
process. Previously, the statutory law was phrased almost entirely
in terms of enabling legislation and thus imposed few restrictions
on the decision-making options and procedures of local planners.
Further, court decisions that involved land use planning issues
were based almost exclusively on the concept of deferring to the
legislative (elected officials') or administrative (experts') judgment, and thus took a "hands off" approach toward local planning
decisions.
However, the lack of legislative and judicial checks upon the
local land use planning and zoning practices resulting from this
"traditional" approach lead to a wide variety of local planning
abuses. Although California has typically been at the forefront in
developing innovative approaches to reform, California's efforts to
reform the local land use planning process to prevent these abuses
have reflected some very deeply ingrained legislative and judicial
trends within the United States.
* A.B., 1963, Yale College; J.D., 1966, Harvard Law School. U.S.C.
Panelist and Lecturer; staff attorney and co-founder of Center for Law in
the Public Interest, Los Angeles.
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I. THE "TRADITIONAL" LEGAL

APPROACH TO THE LOCAL
LAND USE PLANNING PROCESS.

California cities were among the first in the United States to
regulate land use through zoning ordinances, some of which were
enacted as early as 1885.1 These early zoning ordinances were
founded upon the police power authority contained in Article XI,
Section 11 of the California Constitution. The first state-wide
zoning enabling act was legislated in 1917. This statute, as modified from time to time, has since provided the basis for zoning
regulations in California. 2 California's first planning enabling
legislation came later, as it did in 'most states,3 when the Legislature adopted the Conservation and Planning Law. 4 From the time
these two acts were adopted, the California courts took an extremely sympathetic view of their purposes and have consistently upheld
local planners in their efforts to establish and implement a local
land use planning and zoning process.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Board of
Public Works,5 established the framework for all subsequent decisions. Miller upheld the constitutionality of local zoning regulations in the broadest possible language:
[T]he police power is not a circumscribed prerogative, but is
elastic and in keeping with the growth of knowledge and the belief
in the popular mind of the need for its application, capable of
expansion to meet existing conditions of modern life and thereby
keep pace with the social, economic, moral, and intellectual evolution of the human race.
A large discretion is vested in the legislative branch of the government with reference to the exercise of the police power....
Every intendment is to be indulged by the courts in favor of the
validity of its exercise, and unless the measure is clearly oppressive
it will be deemed to be within the purview of that power ....
[A]s long as there are considerations of public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare which the legislative body may have had
1. D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON AND C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE
(CEB 1969), at 4. [Hereinafter cited as CZP.]
2. Id., at 4-13. California never adopted the Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act.
3. See generally, C. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan,
68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955).

4. Calif. Stats. 1947, Ch. 807 § 78 at 1922. This statute has amended,
but formed the basis of what is now CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65000 et seq. (West
1966).
5. 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925).
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in mind, which have justified the regulation, it must be assumed
by the court that the legislative body had those considerations in
mind and that those considerations did justify the regulation.6
The Miller approach was repeatedly used by the California
Supreme Court to uphold local zoning ordinances attacked by
landowners as being in violation of the constitutional prohibitions
against "taking" of property without just compensation and without due process of law. For example, in McCarthy v. Manhatten
Beach,7 a city's zoning of three-fifths of a mile of privately owned
sandy beachfront property as "Beach Recreational" (which meant
that the only structures permitted were lifeguard towers and a small
wire fence and that the property could be used only for beach
recreational activities) was upheld by the supreme court as a
legitimate exercise of the police power. And in Consolidated Rock
Products Co. v. Los Angeles," the California Supreme Court upheld a re-zoning, despite the defendant City's inability to show that
the quarrying activities previously conducted on the land resulted
in any nuisance-like activities and despite the plaintiff landowner's
proof that the re-zoning to exlusively agricultural uses, in essence,
6-totally destroyed the value of his land. One leading legal scholar
writing in 1969 concluded that cases like McCarthy and Consolidated Rock demonstrated that local zoning was "more likely to be
sustained by the California courts than in any other courts in the
country" and that "whatever the decision of the local zoning body,
ot- California courts tend to uphold it.9
Other attempts to develop significant legal constraints upon the
decision-making discretion of local planners were also rejected.
Thus, in Ayres v. Los Angeles,1 ° the California Supreme Court
upheld subdivision exactions requiring, among other things, street
dedications by a proposed developer as a condition to approval of
his subdivision map. The court ruled that it was irrelevant that the
city had no officially adopted local general or master plan by which
the reasonableness and necessity of the exactions could be judged;
the court concluded that it was acceptable to make such evaluations on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, California Government
Code Section 65860 provided that the adoption of a local general
plan was not a precondition to the adoption of a zoning ordinance.

6. Id. at 485, 490, 234 P. 381, at 383, 385.
7. 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
8. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
9. HAGMAN in CZP at 7.

10. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 267 P.2d 1 (1949).
S108

[VOL. 3: S106, 1976]

Control Over the City Plan
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

However, the Planning and Zoning Law," enacted in 1965, did
provide that the local general plan was to be used as the "pattern or
guide" for the "orderly physical growth and development" of the
local jurisdiction. 12 One case decided in the mid-1960s gave some
promise that local general plans would, under those provisions,
become "a constitution for all future development within the city."
O'Loane v. O'Roark 3 involved the question of whether the adoption of a local general plan was subject to referendum. The court
of appeal viewed this issue as turning on whether adoption of such
a plan was a legislative act. Relying heavily on a leading scholar's
analysis of the proper planning role of a local general plan, 14 the
court concluded that the adoption of a general plan was subject to
referendum, particularly since subsequently enacted zoning ordinances "would surely be interpreted in part by their fidelity to
the general plan as well as by the standards of due process."
Speaking of the general plan at issue in the case, the court said:
True, [the City's general plan] is couched in part in general
terms, but there are many specifics, and once adopted it becomes
very effective. Many facets of activities between other public
agencies and the city are effectively determined by the plan. Any
subdivision or other development would necessarily be considered
in its relation to the general plan, and such consideration practically by itself would be a sufficient legislative guide to the exercise of such discretions.
It surely cannot be contemplated that the council, in the adoption
of future zoning ordinances (which are admittedly legislative and
subject to referendum) will go contrary,
(in all but rare instances),
5
to the general plan which it adopts.'

The O'Loane decision, however, was largely ignored by local
planners and elected officials. They continued their now well-

entrenched business-as-usual approach of making zoning decisions
in a manner wholly independent of the provisions and policies set
forth in the adopted local general plan. Some of the problems
resulting from this ad hoc, unfettered approach are described
below.
11.

CAL. GOV'T. CODE

§ 65000 et seq. (West 1966).

12. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65400 (West Supp. 1976).
13. 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1965).

14. C. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L.
1154 (1955). See also C. Haar, The Master Plan-An Impermanent
Constitution, 20 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 353 (1955).
15. Id. at 783, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
REV.
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II.

THE PLANNING ABUSES ENCOURAGED BY THE TRADITIONAL
LEGAL APPROACH AND RESULTING LEGISLATIVE REFORMS.

The 1965 provisions of the Planning and Zoning Law required
every city and county to adopt "a comprehensive, long-term general plan."' 6 This plan was to consist of "a statement of development policies" and was to contain "a diagram or diagrams and text
setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals."'1 7 Certain elements were mandatory (a land use element and
a housing element),1 8 while other elements were optional (e.g., a
"conservation element"). 19 As noted above, once adopted, the
general plan was to serve as a "pattern or guide" for the "orderly
'20
physical growth and development of the county or city.
But it was soon observed that cities and counties were disregarding the thrust of both the statute and the O'Loane decision. The
1968 State Development Plan Program, prepared by the State
Office of Planning, found that:
Although preparation of a General Plan is required by law, only
about two-thirds of the cities of the state have adopted one. The
plans exhibit major gaps in responding to primary development
policy needs .... The plans tend to be static, prescriptive and
locational. They also tend to ignore proposals for economic, social,
visual, resource, fiscal, service and jurisdictional matters.
Review and updating of plans is spotty, with less than one-fourth
of cities with General Plans reconsidering them in a regularized
way .... A substantial number of cities still use zoning as completely unrelated to long-range planning objectives.
Probably less than 20 percent of all counties in the state can
be considered 21to have thoroughly prepared, up-to-date, effective
general plans.

In 1970 the Legislature addressed itself for the first time to the
local planning deficiencies described in the 1968 study. The
Legislature had appointed a Joint Committee on Open Space
Lands to recommend legislation to cope with some of these problems. The Joint Committee prepared a Final Report2 2 in 1970
setting out the purpose of its proposed legislation. The Final
Report focused on two particular inadequacies of local planning:
16. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65300 (West 1966).
17. Id. § 65363 (West -).
18. Id. § 65302 (West Supp. 1976). The land use and circulation ele-

ments became mandatory in 1955. The housing element was made mandatory in 1969.
19. Id. § 65303 (West Supp. 1966).
20. Id. § 65400 (West Supp. .1976).
21. 1968 State Development Plan Program,at 259-60.

22. CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE AND ASSEMBLY JOINT COMMITTEE ON OPEN
SPACE LANDS, FINAL REPORT (1970).
[Hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT.]
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first, a large number of local governments were not adequately
planning for their open space resources, and second, those that did
have such plans were disregarding them in their subsequent regulatory actions (e.g., zoning) rather than implementing them. The
Joint Committee summarized its concerns over these problems as
follows:
Under present law there is no requirement that open space needs
be considered in community planning. In those instances where
open space requirements are considered in local planning, there
is no requirement to relate land-use decisions to the plan. It is
important, therefore, (a) to assure that open space be considered
as a part of the overall planning process, and (b) to guarantee
decisions be made within the conthat public and private land-use
23
text of planning decisions.

Regarding the first problem, the Final Report stated:
While some local governments have adopted an open space element of their general plan, no requirement that they do is contained in the planning law.
A large number of local agencies do not plan for open space.
The result of this is that most local plans are development oriented.
frequently dominates planning for
Planning for urban expansion
24
open space preservation.

As a legislative solution to this first problem, the Joint Commit-

tee recommended 25 and the Legislature enacted 26 provisions requiring that open space elements be included as a mandatory
element of each local general plan. To underscore the Legislature's sense of urgency, provisions were added 27 for the first time to
and adoption of the now
establish deadlines for the preparation
28
mandatory open space element.

The Joint Committee also prepared findings on the second
problem: the flouting of these plans by the local governments
23. Id. at 37.
24. Id. at 23-24.
25. Id. at 25.
26. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65563 (West Supp. 1976).
27. Id.
28. The deadline date was initially established as June 30, 1972. This
was postponed first for one year to June 30, 1973 (Stats. 1972, ch. 251),
and subsequently to December 31, 1973 (Stats. 1973, ch. 120, § 4). It may
be noted that cities and counties were required by state law enacted as
early as 1929 to have master zoning plans. The California Attorney General had ruled that, in the absence of a deadline date, there was considerable leeway in the timing requirements. (4 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 150
(1944).)
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which already had them. The Final Report focused on the problems resulting from the dichotomy between the general plan and
the regulatory control measures, such as zoning. The Joint Committee criticized the practice, prevalent among cities and counties,
of developing two parallel plans-one the official general plan, and
the other the de facto plan drawn by the local body as it administers zoning and other land use programs. Instead, the Joint Committee reported, "Ideally, there should be unity between these two
plans. ' 29 According to the Final Report:
The best plan poorly followed can be of little value ....

Until

local actions are required to comply with the appropriate local
plan, the danger of thwarting planning goals will continue....
It is not enough merely to plan for open space preservation.
There must be some public assurance that the plans will be carried out. One means of insuring that local space plans are carried
out is to require that land designated as open space in a local
plan be restricted to open space uses.
exists no guarantee
In the absence of such a requirement, there
30
that open space objectives will be carried out.

The Legislature, which adopted these recommendations in several provisions in the 1970 Act, required an "action program" consisting of "specific programs" which the local body "intends to
pursue in implementing its open space plan; 31 it also required
adoption of a comprehensive "open space zoning ordinance" that
would be "consistent with" the open space plan by December 31,
1972.32 Most importantly, however, the Legislature provided for
the first time that a "consistency requirement" be applied to all
subsequent land use decisions in the local jurisdictions:
Any action by a county or city by which open space land or
any interest therein is acquired or disposed of or its use restricted
to this part, must be conor regulated, whether or not pursuant
33
sistent with the local open space plan.

And it further provided that:
No building permit may be issued, no subdivision map approved,
and no open space zoning ordinance adopted, unless the proposed
or ordinance is consistent with the local
construction, subdivision
34
open space plan.

In 1971 the Legislature extended the consistency requirement to
encompass not only the open space element of the general plan but
29. FINAL REPORT, at 24.
30. Id. at 24-25.
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65564 (West Supp. 1976).
32. Id. § 65910 (West Supp. 1976).
33. Id. § 65566 (West Supp. 1976).
34. Id. § 65567 (West Supp. 1976).
S112
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the entire general plan. The purpose of the 1971 legislation 3
which emanated from the Joint Assembly Subcommittee on Premature Subdivisions, was explained in the Subcommittee's Staff Recommendations for Legislative Action:
At present, local zoning ordinances are not required to be consistent with city and county general plans. This type of latitude
may have been justified during the initial period after the Legislature required all cities and counties to have general plans. At
that time, some 'period of grace' was necessary during which existing zoning ordinances could be brought into conformity with new
general plans.
At the present time, it is neither wise nor reasonable to permit
this type of land use policy to continue any longer.
The 1970 Legislature took the first step towards eliminating this
inconsistency between local zoning by requiring that all local zoning ordinances dealing with open space be consistent with the open
space element of local general plans (Chapter 1590). To insure
proper local development, however, all local zoning ordinances
should be required to be consistent with local general plans.
At present, the law does not require that proposed subdivisions
be consistent with local plans.
Thus, it is possible for a subdivision map to be approved which
is actually at variance with local plans. This loophole in the law
subverts
the integrity and the utility of the local planning proc36
ess.
Thus, AB 1301 was drafted by the Subcommittee and enacted by
the Legislature in 1971. The essence of AB 1301 was to require,
first, that all zoning be made consistent with the local general plan
by a deadline date of mid-1973 37 and, second, that all subdivision
map approvals be consistent with the local general plan.38
The other major legislative response to some of the problems
created by local planning abuses was the enactment in 1970 of the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). 3 9 Much has been
written about CEQA and its peculiar legislative history 40 and it
35. CAL. STATS. 1971, ch. 1446, at 2852.
36. JoINT ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREMATURE SUBDIVISIONS, STAFF

3-5 (1970).
Later postponed to December 31, 1973, by Stats. 1973, ch. 120, § 4.
AB 1301 also required denial of the subdivision map if certain "findregarding the environmental impact of the proposed development
not be made. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66451, 66474.) (Formerly CAL.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, at

37.
38.
ings"
could

BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 11526 and 11549.5).

39. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
40. See Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County Board of Supervisors,
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would serve no purpose here to rehash some of the debates about
what CEQA was and was not intended to do. Suffice it to say that
the California Legislature was obviously copying CEQA's parent
statute, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 41 Like
NEPA, CEQA has two distinct parts: first, a policy section which
sets forth the State Legislature's mandate that henceforth environmental preservation is to be "the guiding criterion" in public
decisions 42 and, second, a procedural Section which requires environmental impact reports (EIRs) on all projects which might have
43
significant environmental consequences.
III.

A.

THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM.

Two Judicial Trends.

The California Legislature when it enacted CEQA, like Congress
when it enacted NEPA, was giving legislative form to a fundamental, and now deeply ingrained, judicial trend toward requiring
public agencies to articulate in writing the factors on which their
actions are based. This trend has perhaps been best summarized
and explained in EDF v. Ruckelshaus,44 where Chief Judge Bazelon wrote:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the
long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and reviewing courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative policy decisions with great deference, confining judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of substance,
the courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction of the 'substantial evidence' test, and a bow to the mysteries
of administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less
often exercised, the power to set aside agency action on the ground
that an impermissible factor had entered into the decision, or a
crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, that
power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the require-

ment that administratorsarticulate the factors on which they base
their decisions.
Strict adherence to that requirement is especially important now
that the character of administrative litigation is changing. As a
result of expanding doctrines of standing and reviewability, and
new statutory causes of action, courts are increasingly asked to
review administrative action that touches on fundamental personal
interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have always
had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with the
economic interests at stake in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.

8 Cal. 3d 247, at 254-66, 502 P.2d 1049, at 1053-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, at 76574 (1972).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
42. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000 (West Supp. 1976).
43. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21100, 21151 (West Supp. 1976).

44. 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 71).
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To protect these interests from administrative arbitrariness, it

is necessary, but not sufficient, to insist on strict judicial scrutiny
of administrative action. For judicial review alone can correct only
the most egregious abuses. Judicial review must operate to ensure
that the administrative process itself will confine and control the
exercise of discretion. Courts should require administrative officers to articulate the standards and principles that govern their

discretionary decisions in as much detail as possible. Rules and

regulations should be freely formulated by administrators, and revised when necessary. Discretionary decisions should more often
be supported with findings of fact and reasoned opinions. When

administratorsprovide a framework for principled decision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative process, and

of judicial review in those cases where
to improve the quality 45
judicial review is sought.

The federal courts have frequently been at the forefront of this
judicial trend. Indeed, NEPA itself was largely a legislative codification of two landmark environmental cases-Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n,46 and Udall v. Federal
Power Comm'n4 7 -in which the federal courts required the public
agency to affirmatively develop a reviewable written record regarding the environmental consequences of a proposed project, a list of
alternatives to it, and a statement of the reasons why the project
48
was thought desirable or necessary.
Where NEPA has been involved, the courts have seen its commands as providing a strong legislative mandate supporting the
judicial trend toward requiring public agencies to develop contemporaneous written records regarding all phases of their environmental decision-making process-even where it could be argued
49
that no environmental impact statement is specifically required.
Indeed, apart from cases involving NEPA, the federal courts have
increasingly required public agencies to prepare contemporaneous
45. Id. at 597-98 (Emphasis added).
46. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
47. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
48. See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

(1972) at 223. See also, Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power

Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 1972) and Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 468 (2d Cir. 1971) (describ-

ing NEPA as codifying the judicial approach of these cases).
49. See, e.g., Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanley
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Scientists Institute for Public
Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

See also: EDF

v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972) (collecting cases).
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written records of their decision-making process including a full
discussion of the reasons for their decisions. 50 The leading commenators strongly support this judicial trend. 51 Among the state
courts, the California appellate courts have long recognized the
weighty reasons behind the trend and have supported it wherever
52
possible.
Viewed in this light, the California Supreme Court's controversial Friends of Mammoth5 3 ruling and its subsequent decision in
the Topanga case5 4 are not surprising. Indeed, the court in Mammoth viewed the enactment of CEQA and its requirement of environmental impact reports as a legislative affirmation of this trend,
particularly in the "field of ecology."5 5 The court saw the EIR
procedural requirements as being designed to assure that the CEQA
substantive policies would, in fact, be carried out.5 6 Only by the
courts' rigorous insistence that the agency officials set out in writing their detailed analysis of the proposed project's environmental
impacts would these lofty goals be accomplished. The judiciary
was to be active in seeing to it that agencies actually made environ50. See, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc, v. Zoning Comm'n, of

D.C., 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (written statement of reasons for action
must be prepared by zoning board in its quasi-legislative activities even
though formal "findings" not required by statute); Greater Boston TV v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(agency must articulate with reasonable clarity the basis for its decisions);
Jones v. D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) (agency required to articulate objective standards for agency's decision making); Holmes v. N.Y.C.
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) (same); New Castle County
Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 371 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reasoned analysis
prepared by agency particularly required where it appears agency is acting
inconsistently with previously adopted policies); Powelton Civic Homeowners Ass'n v. HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (agency must base
decisions on complete record reflecting views of all recognized interests).
51. See, Jaffe, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (1971); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.00 (Supp. 1970); Reich, The Law of the
Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
52. See, e.g., Broadway, Laguna, Etc., Ass'n v. Board of Permit Appeals,
66 Cal. 2d 767, 427 P.2d 810, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967); California Motor
Transport Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Cal. 2d 270, 379 P.2d 324,
28 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1963); California Ass'n of Nursing Homes, Etc., Inc.
v. Williams, 4 Cal. App. 3d 800, 813, 84 Cal. Rptr. 590, 599 (1970); County
of Amador v. State Board of Equalization, 240 Cal. App. 2d 205, 216, 49
Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 (1966).
53. Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
54. Topanga Ass'n For A Scenic Community v. Los Angeles County,
11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974).
55. 8 Cal. 3d 252, 270, 502 P.2d 1049, 1064, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 776-77
(1972).

56. Id. at 263, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
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mental considerations play a significant role in their decisions and
did not simply pay lip service to CEQA's substantive policies. 57
Similarly, the court in Topanga emphasized that, even where
EIRs were not necessarily required by CEQA, detailed written
findings and analyses of a public agency's decisions were nevertheless required anytime the agency acted in a quasi-judicial capacity
in its land use decision-making activities. Relying on California
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1094.5 (which placed certain
obligations on the courts), the court ruled that an implicit duty was
imposed on the public agency to prepare specific written findings
which "bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and the
ultimate decision or order," and reveal the "analytic route the
administrative agency traveled from evidence to action.158 Candidly admitting that this Topanga requirement was judicially (rather than legislatively) created, the court noted that the requirement
would "facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that
the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions." 5' 9
Furthermore, such findings would enable the reviewing court to
trace and examine the agency's mode of analysis, thereby facilitating judicial review of the agency's substantive decision. 6 0
Lo
This judicial trend requiring written findings by administrative
agencies is prompted largely by a judicially perceived need for
more frequent, more probing and more intense judicial review of
the public agency's decision on the merits. The procedural requirements of detailed, written analyses are designed to open the
agency decision-making process, not only to the public, but also to
the courts. Chief Justice Bazelon's approach in EDF v. Ruckelshaus,61 is repeatedly reflected in the California Supreme Court's
opinions-opinions which express concern with abuses which have
arisen in the agency decision-making process and which view a
more active judicial role as at least a partial solution to those
problems.
In Friends of Mammoth,6 2 the California Supreme Court said:
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
11 Cal. 3d 506, 515, 522 P.2d 12, 17, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 (1972).
Id. at 516, 522 P.2d at 18, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
Id.
439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
8 Cal. 3d 252, 297, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
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[CEQA] was designed to be a milestone in the campaign for
'maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state

now and in the future.

.'63

The court stated further:
In an era of commercial and industrial expansion in which the
environment has been repeatedly violated by those who are oblivithe significance of this
ous to the ecological well-being of society,
64
legislative act cannot be understated.
The judiciary plays a crucial role under this environmental legislation: its duty is to assure that the important legislative purposes,
heralded in the legislative halls, are not lost or misdirected in the
course of their day-to-day administration, 65 and that state and local
entities do not simply give vague or illusry assurances that CEQA's
6
substantive goals had been taken into account.
Similarly, the Topanga decision repeatedly refers to the need for
"vigorous and meaningful judicial review" of the agency's substantive decision (by means of the required findings) to ensure that
administrative boards do not subvert the intended decision-making
structure.6 7 The Topanga decision takes special note of the "casual" procedures employed by many zoning boards, and cites the
potential conflicts of interest that zoning board members (who are
frequently drawn from the real estate development industry) often
68
have.
Thus, the past ten years have witnessed the accompanying development of a second judicial trend in which the courts have been
increasingly active in protecting the public against abuses in administrative and local government decision-making. While in the
past, courts might have held that judicial review of agency action is
inappropriate because discretion to make the decision was vested in
the agency, recently they have more frequently articulated substantive restrictions upon the exercise of government officials' discre..
tion often basing these restrictions on very broad "policy" declara-.
tions contained in legislative acts.6 9 For example, in the landmark
U.S. Supreme Court case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe,70 the Court construed the broad policy embodied in the
63. Id. at 292, 502 P.2d at 1051, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
64. Id. at 254, 502 P.2d at 1053, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 263, 502 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 771.
67. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 517, 522 P.2d 12, 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836, 842 (1974).
68. Id. at 518, 522 P.2d at 19, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
69. See, generally, Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis,
78 YALE L. J. 965 (1969); Saferstein, Non-reviewability: A Functional Anal.ysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
70. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 71 which directed the
Secretary of Transportation not to release funds for the construction of a highway using public park land if there is a "feasible and
prudent alternative." The Secretary had contended that the statute
imposed no limits upon his discretion, since the statute was simply
a directive to consider these very broad matters. The Court,
however, ruled that the command imposed substantive and judicially reviewable legal restrictions on the Secretary's discretion.
Such actions were always subject to judicial review unless there was
"clear and convincing evidence" 72 that the Legislature intended to
preclude such review. Also, substantive decisions were never
"committed to agency discretion" and thus insulated from judicial
review except where statutes are drawn in "such broad terms that
in a given case there [was] no law to apply. '73
In Overton Park there was no such broad and "wide-ranging
balancing of competing interest"7 4 involved in applying the "feasible and prudent alternative" standard because the criteria which
could be articulated7 5 under that standard were sufficiently "clear
and specific" 76 and gave the courts a basis for review of the
propriety of the agency's action on a case-by-case basis. The
Court went on to emphasize that judicial review of the merits of the
agency's decision in such cases must involve a substantial inquiry;
the presumption of regularity of the agency's decision should not
shield it from a "thorough, probing, in-depth review." 77 The
scope of such judicial review was first, to ensure that the agency
had acted within the scope of its legal authority and, second, to
inquire whether it was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a "clear error in judgment. '78
71.

49 U.S.C. § 1653 (Supp. 1976).

72. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1972).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 411.
75. Id.
76. Under the Court's articulated criteria, the statutory term "feasible"
meant simply whether "sound engineering" principles would approve of
it, while the statutory term "prudent" meant that, in contrast to the usual
run-of-the-mill case, putting a freeway through a park in the instant case
involved unusual factors and problems of truly extraordinary magnitude.
The Court deduced these criteria from its analysis of the purpose of the
statute, that, all other things being equal, the protection of parkland was
to be given paramount importance.
77. 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1972).
78. 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1972).
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The California Supreme Court has adopted an approach similar
to Overton Park, concluding that public agency action is subject to
judicial review on the merits in all cases "that seek to measure
governmental performance against a legal standard. ' 79 In Harmon v. City and County of San Francisco,0 the court stated that
courts will not review public agency actions that "involve the
exercise of indefinable discretion," but they must review agency
"conduct that can be tested against legal standards."'"
A recent environmental case shows how the California Supreme
Court will implement this broad view of court review of an agency's substantive decision to ensure that the agency complies with
the legislative mandate. In Clean Air Constituency v. California
State Air Resources Board, 2 the legislation in question authorized
the Air Resources Board (ARB) to administer a statewide program to equip 1966 through 1970 model year vehicles with devices
to control nitgrogen oxide emissions and thereby consequently enhance the quality of the air throughout California. The ARB,
however, chose to delay the implementation of the program for the
stated reason of conserving gasoline during the energy crisis. The
court ruled that the ARB had a limited authority and discretion to
delay the program for reasons which relate to effectuating the
purpose of the legislation but that it had no authority to delay it for
reasons related to the energy crisis.
In discussing the relationship between the Legislature and the
agencies, the supreme court stated:
When the Legislature enacted the Air Resources Act and the
NOx legislation, it concluded as a matter of fundamental policy
that urgent action against automobile pollution was essential for
the health of California's residents. In effect, it made clean air
a higher priority than the concern for fuel consumption, the problem of rising costs in transportation, or the economics of the automobile industry. After making this policy determination, the Legislature directed the ARB to establish a program which would
accomplish the goal of pollution control. In response, the ARB
determined that urgent action against the energy crisis was essential
for the economic well-being of the state. In effect, its action to
delay the NOx program for one year inverted the priorities by
making energy consumption loftier in significance then concern for
clean air. In other words, when the ARB postponed the NOx leg-

79. Harman v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 160-61,

496 P.2d 1248, 1255, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 887 (1972).

80. Id.
81. Id. See also, Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 3d 251, 481
P.2d 489, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1971); Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365,
411 P.2d 801, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966); Griffin v. Board of Supervisors,
60 Cal. 2d 318, 384 P.2d 489, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1963).

82. 11 Cal. 3d 801, 523 P.2d 617, 114 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1974).
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islation, it made the same kind of fundamental-though contrarypolicy determination the Legislature had made when it enacted
the programin the first instance.8 3
The court concluded that, when the ARB exercised its authority to
delay the NOx program, it was required to affirmatively justify that
action with legitimate reasons:
Each time the ARB elects to defer the Nox program, it must
justify the action in terms which relate to speedy installation, substantial pollution reduction, or effective enforcement. This interpretation of Vehicle Code section 4602 enables the ARB to exercise
enough discretion to carry out the broad purposes of the Air Resources Act, and still reserves to the Legislature as the most representative organ of government the right to make those crucial
policy determinations for which it has competence, information,
and time. (Davis, Administrative Law (3d ed. 1972) pp. 92-93.) 84
These dual judicial trends-requiring detailed written analyses
prepared by the agency and greater involvement by the courts in
reviewing the substantive "merits" of the agency decision-have
had enormous consequences for the local land use planner.8,5 Some
consequences of particular importance are discussed below.
83. Id. at 817, 523 P.2d at 627, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 587. (Emphasis added.)
84. Id. at 819, 523 P.2d at 628, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 588. (Emphasis added.)
85. Because of space limitations, this article does not discuss some of
the extremely important recent judicial developments relating to constitutionally derived substantive restraints on local planners. These include,
for example, the recent series of California cases involving the "taking"
clause and alleged inverse condemnation. E.g., compare Klopping v. Wbittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), with Selby Realty
Co. v. San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799
(1973). The recent H.F.H., Ltd. case makes it clear that, except possibly
in the most extreme situations, inverse condemnation is still unavailable
in California as a basis for property owner attacks on local planning and
zoning activities. (H.F.H., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365, 542 P.2d 237 (1975).) A series of recent federal cases, involving
challenges to restricted growth and development of local general plan and
zoning schemes, and based upon a wide variety of federal constitutional
principles, makes it clear that the federal courts will continue to remain
aloof from state and local planning and zoning issues. See, e.g., Village
of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Construction Industry Ass'n
v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 8 ERC 1001 (9th Cir. 1975); Ybarra
v. Los Altos Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Litigation in the
state courts under state constitutional principles may be much more likely
to result in imposition of substantive control on the discretion of local
planners. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel,
336 A.2d 713, 67 N.J. 151 (1975), discussed, infra.
Also beyond the scope of this article are judicially enforceable substantive restrictions on the decision-making discretion of non-local planners.
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B.

Judicial Enforcement of the Substantive Duties Imposed on
Local Plannersby CEQA.

It is, of course, now black letter law in California that the CEQA
procedural duty to prepare environmental impact reports (EIRs)
prior to taking proposed local government action runs virtually the
full gamet of public agency decision-making activity in the land use
planning process-ranging from preparation and adoption of a
local general plan and plan amendments"" at the most general level
of decision-making, through adoption of zone changes,8 7 all the
way to issuance of conditional use permits 8 and even, in some
cases, to issuance of building permits.8 9 It is also settled that the
courts have the power, indeed the obligation, to review the adequacy of the EIRs, when they are challenged in the courts, to ensure
that they fully describe the potential environmental and growthinducing impacts associated with the proposal, the alternatives to it,
the possible mitigation measures, and the reasons for the proposed
course of action.90
What has been less clear, until recently, is whether the substantive policies set forth in CEQA are simply unenforceable exhortations to action or whether they create binding legal requirements
which circumscribe the agency's substantive decision making powThe federal courts are
ers and are enforceable in the courts.'
For example, in Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d
263 (1975), the Supreme Court ruled that under the then-in-effect provisions of the Knox-Nisbet Act a local agency formation commission
("LAFCo") was under no substantive duty to disapprove a proposed annexation even though it would admittedly result in "urban sprawl." The Act
has recently been amended, however, in a manner which may impose this
substantive duty on LAFCos. (Gov. CODE §§ 54790, 54790.1 and 54790.2).
86. State CEQA Guidelines, § 15037, CAL. ADMIN. CODE, TIT. 14. Bozung
v. Local Agency Formation Commission, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118
Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975).

87. PUB.

§ 21151. See Rosenthal v. Board of Supervisors.,
119 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1975).

RES. CODE

44 Cal. App. 3d 815,

88. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr,
761 (1972).
89. Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr,
247 (1975).

90. See, e.g., EDF v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 289, 4 ERC 1829 (8th Cir. 1972);
EDF v. Coastside County Water District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr.
197 (1972).
91. It should be emphasized that, even if CEQA were read as itself inde.pendently creating no judicially enforceable substantive obligations, a pub.-

lic agency's substantive decisions would in most cases still be subject to
judicial review "on the merits." A petitioner seeking to challenge such ac.tion would argue that the substantive merits of the decision were inconsistent with other substantive obligations imposed on the agency by some
other statute (as in the Clean Air Constituency and Topanga cases, or that
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divided on the issue of whether NEPA creates substantive obligations upon federal agencies, with the majority of circuits concluding that it does.9 2 In EDF v. Corps of Engineers,93 the court ruled
that the broad policies stated in section 101 of NEPA were "substantive" and that the courts "have an obligation on the merits" to
review the action in question to see if these policies were not
properly implemented. The requirement that agencies prepare
environmental impact statements under Section 102 of NEPA was
an "action-forcing" provision to ensure that the substantive Section
101 policies are given effect. The court stated:
NEPA is silent to judicial review, and no special reasons appear
for not reviewing the decision of the agency. To the contrary,
the prospect of substantive review should improve the quality of
agency decisions and should make94 it more likely that the broad
purposes of NEPA will be realized.

The California Supreme Court's Friends of Mammoth decision
can be read as endorsing a similar concept under CEQA. The
Mammoth court stated that:
Obviously, if the adverse consequences to the environment can
be mitigated, or if feasible alternatives are available, the proposed
activity, such as issuance of a building permit, should not be approved. 9 5

Accordingly, in Burger v. County of Mendocino, 6 the court of
appeal ruled that issuance of a building permit for an 80-unit motel
the decision was wholly unsupported by any substantive evidence and thus
constituted an abuse of discretion properly set aside by the courts pursuant
to CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 1085 or § 1094.5. In such a challenge, the petitioner would undoubtedly use the facts and analysis set out in the agency's
EIR on the proposal as ammunition for the attack on the decision itself.
See, e.g., National Wildlife Federation v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286, ERC
2128 (D.D.C. 1975) (agency's decision to permit off-road vehicles on public
lands and EIS thereon rejected); Concerned About Trident v. Schlessinger,
8 ERC 1129 (D.D.C. 1975) (Trident project and EIS thereon upheld); Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the Public Interest v. Board of
Supervisors, 8 ERC 1249 (L.A. Co. Sup. Ct. 1975) (Los Angeles County general plan and EIR thereon rejected), discussed infra.
92. See, generally, Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach To
Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARV. L. REV. 735 (1975), and EDF
v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, at 299-300 and note 15 (8th Cir. 1972)
(collecting cases).
93. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
94. Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
95. 8 Cal. 3d 247 at 263 and note 8, 522 P.2d at 1059, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
771 (1972).
96. 45 Cal. App. 3d 322, 117 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1975).
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complex should be set aside. The EIR and planning staff reports
on the complex had recommended against approval of the motel in
the form proposed by the applicant and recommended a smaller
alternative motel. However, the County Board of Supervisors had
affirmed the project as proposed after "full consideration" of the
EIR, without contradicting the EIR's environmental analysis and
without stating any "overriding economic or social values. '97 The
court's ruling was based both on the lack of any written or articulated reasons for rejecting the EIR recommendations and upon the
conclusion that there was no evidence that the recommended (environmentally preferable) alternative was unfeasible economically
or profitably.
Further, in San Francisco Ecology Center v. City and County of
San Francisco,98 the court of appeal expressly concluded that
CEQA imposes substantive duties on local planning officials and
that the courts were obliged to review agency decisions "on their
merits" to assure that they complied with these substantive commands. Indeed, CEQA imposed substantive decision-making standards on state public officials that were considerably higher than
those imposed on federal officials by NEPA; CEQA made environmental concerns "the guiding criterion in public decision," 99 while
under NEPA environmental factors were placed only on a par with
other factors.
The most recent, and by far the most complex, instance in which
CEQA's substantive obligations upon local planning officials have
been involved is Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning in the
Public Interest v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County.100
There, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors had adopted
a local general plan in 1970 which had allocated 173 square miles
of additional "urban expansion" through 1990 based on expected
population growth of 2.2 million persons (above the 7 million
1970 population) by 1990.101 The State Legislature in 1971 estab97. Id. at 326, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
98. 48 Cal. App. 3d 584, 122 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1975).
99. Id. at 590-91, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
100. 8 ERC 1249. (L.A. County Superior Ct. No. C-63218, July 9, 1975)
(hereinafter cited as Coalition).
101. Coalition Finding of Fact No. 11. Under the 1970 plan's urban development policy, about half of the 2.2 million population growth was projected for proposed "centers" of urbanization, while the remainder was projected for the existing urbanized area and for the "urban expansion" areas.
In addition, some scattered rural-type development was to be permitted in
an area called "open and rural" which included the vast majority (approximately 3,000 square miles) of undeveloped land within the County's unincorporated area.
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lished the consistency requirement by enacting AB 1301, which
required Los Angeles County to follow the 1970 plan. Since
following that plan would have required extensive downzoning of
County in the fall of 1972 embarked on a
private property,10 the
"crash program.' 2 The purpose of this program was to bring the
County's 1970 plan into conformity with pre-existing zoning (and
to honor the requests of individual property owners for specific
treatment of particular parcels), rather than to bring the zoning
into conformity with the local general plan as AB 1301 had
required. 0 3 Ironically, at the same time that County planners
were doubling the new plan's urban expansion areas (to 341
square miles) in order to suit this purpose, the County's population
growth projections were plunging dramatically so that by 1973,
when the new plan was adopted, only about 700,000 new persons
were expected by 1990-a reduction in expected population
growth of over 1.5 million. 0 4 Furthermore, the information and
data that County planners did develop regarding the proposed
additional urban expansion was never incorporated into the new
plan nor even included in the EIR accompanying the plan.'0 5 One
study, for example, showed that the new urban expansion areas
conflicted with natural resource factors in 99 percent of all instances, including the intrusion of urban expansion into 10 percent
of the "significant ecological areas" existing in the Santa Monica
Another study showed that two-thirds of the land
Mountains'
Santa Monica Mounnewly placed into urban categories within the
10 7
tains was the least suitable for urbanization.
The court ruled that the County had violated CEQA's procedures
by deliberatley excluding this sort of information from the EIR,
08
and it had also violated CEQA's substantive planning duties.' The
sort of planning which was aimed at achieving a preconceived
result that was implicit in simply adopting pre-existing zoning into
the new general plan without re-evaluation of the propriety of
102. Coalition Finding of Fact No. 9.
103. Id. No. 12.

104. Id. No. 11.
105. Id. No. 12.
106. Id. No. 13.
107. Id.

108. Coalition Conclusion of Law No. 19.
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urbanizing those parcels was impermissible under CEQA. 10 9 Rather, CEQA required that pre-existing zoning and individual property
owner requests should have been re-evaluated "in terms of comprehensive goals and policies, of adequate environmental information
and data. .. , and of current projection of expected future population growth." 110 The general plan should have been based not
only upon adequate environmental information )presumably in the
EIR) but also upon an "adequate relationship" to comprehensive
goals and policies and upon an "adequate relation" to current
population growth projections.'1 1
The Coalition decision is remarkable because these duties were
placed upon the local planner as a result of CEQA's somewhat
general substantive policy commands. Matters which the silent
Planning and Zoning Law presumably leaves to the discretion of
local planners are now precluded by CEQA. Current population
projections, for example, must not only be developed in preparing
a local general plan but they must be used and incorporated into the
plan. Although the County did not appeal the Coalition decision,
the trial judge's ruling in that case serves as a landmark by which
local planners will have to gauge the propriety of their actions and
plans.
C.

Judicial Enforcement of the Substantive Duties Imposed on
Local Plannersby the Planning and Zoning Law.

1. The Open Space Element.
The Planning and Zoning Law provisions relating to the open
space element are unique. That element, as adopted, must be
consistent with certain state objectives which are declared and set
forth with detail. These state-declared objectives are set forth in
the California Government Code. Section 65562 states the Legislature's intent to assure that local bodies prepare open space plans
which will accomplish the objectives of a comprehensive open
space plan, including the preservation of open space land whenever
possible; 1 2 Section 65561 requires the local open space plan to
meet other state objectives, including the discouragement of "...
premature and unnecessary conversion of open space land to urban
uses." 113
109. See EDF v. Coastside County Water District, 27 Cal. App. 3d 695,
104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
110. CoalitionConclusion of law No. 19.

111. Id. No. 18.
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE

§ 65562.

113. CAL. Gov' T CODE § 65561 (b) (West Supp. 1976).
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The Joint Committee on Open Space Land's 1970 Final Report
explained why these provisions were included:
It can be said that the state's overall interest in open space conservation will never be protected until each of its subordinate units
align its open space policies and programs with those of the state.
Local decisions can easily undercut and erode statewide objectives.
must be bound to carry out
Accordingly, both cities and counties
11 4
the objectives declared by the state."

The Legislature thus required that local bodies may not simply
prepare any open space plan they desire; rather, they must have a
plan which is consistent with the dual stated objectives of (a)
preserving open space land wherever possible, and (b) "discourag-

ing premature and unnecessary conversion of open space land to
urban uses."" 15

The Coalition case, also included a challenge to the Los Angeles
County 1973 general plan based upon the alleged inadequacy of
the open space element. Here, too, the court nullified the County's
planning effort. When the 1970 plan had been adopted, three
basic alternative forms of urban design had been studied: "centers" (where projected population growth and economic activity
would be primarily directed toward certain designated existing and
projected "centers"); "corridors" (where new growth would be

directed to existing and projected traffice corridors); and "dispersal" (essentailly a "sprawl" pattern). The 1970 plan had chosen
an urban development policy based on a "modified centers" concept which allowed for some urban expansion (although by no
means in a "dispersal" pattern) with the primary emphasis on

development of the "centers." However, according to the court,
the 1973 plan had incorporated a "dispersal"' " pattern by doubling
the urban expansion area (despite the drop in projected population
growth) and by using an "excess population capacity" 117 of approximately 1500 percent. Furthermore, the 1500 percent figure
(which contrasted with the 1970 plan's deliberately chosen "excess
population capacity" of 15 percent) was "not selected . . . on the
basis of any calculated policy judgment, but was merely the ulti114. Final Report at 24, supra, Note 22 (emphasis added).
115. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65561, 65562.

116. The difference between the amount of projected population growth
over the time period of the plan, and the amount of development actually
allowed to absorb that growth. An excess population capacity of zero
means that permitted development exactly matches projected growth.
117. Coalition Finding of Fact No. 34.
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mate result of the arbitrary planning procedures employed by the
staff" in preparing the 1973 plan.118 Indeed, the added urban
expansion areas "conflicted with natural resource factors in almost
all instances, many of which were serious conflicts, such as the
intrusion of urban uses into flood hazard areas and into significant
'11 9
ecological areas throughout the County.
The court ruled that this sort of planning violated California
Government Code Sections 65561 and 65562. These provisions
placed a substantive obligation on local governments to allow
conversion of open space land to urban uses through a general plan
and supplemental zoning ordinances only when there was a "rational basis" for this action. Judicial review was appropriate to
ensure these requirements had been followed. According to the
court:
[The County] failed to comply with [its] duty . . .to adopt
a general plan that carries out the State declared objectives set
forth in Gov [sic] Code § 65561(b) in at least two respects: First,
the designation of 178 additional square miles for urban expansion
having nowhere been satisfactorily explained, constitutes a '...
premature and unnecessary conversion of open space land to urban
uses. . . .' Second, certain 'significant ecological areas' have been
designated for urban expansion, and, having been nowhere satisan unnecessary conversion of open
factorily explainedi constitutes
space land to urban use.120
Besides conflicting with the policy of the state law, the court ruled
that the open space plan had another defect: its regulatory program was too limited and superficial. Thus, the "Rural I" classification (which was the lowest density provided by the plan at one
dwelling unit per two acres) included 119,925 acres "with widely
varying conditions of topography, weather, vegetation, etc.," and
encompassed "many types of natural resources subject to many
different types of dangers to them from development uses.' 12 1 The
court ruled that these "broad brush provisions" of the open space
regulatory program, without further provisions "to protect the
widely varying natural resources in those areas from the different
dangers to them" were inconsistent with the plan's stated policies of
protecting the natural resources in those areas. 1 22 The program
and the zoning should have been evaluated in the context of these
widely varying circumstances so as to determine the best choices
118. Id. No. 36.

119.
120.
121.
122.
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Id. No. 35.
Coalition Conclusion of Law No. 24.
Coalition Finding of Fact No. 41.
Id. No. 33(e).
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from among all the different types of open space zoning for these
123
different areas.

The Coalition court issued its writ of mandate ordering the
county to prepare and adopt a new open space plan and regulatory
program-on which, this time, would comply with state law requirements. The Coalition decision, here again, represents the
current "high water mark" of litigation designed to enforce the new
legislative reforms. But Coalition is no maverick. A similar
approach was taken in Save Rural Woodside v. Woodside 24 and
similar judicial decisions are likely when appropriate challenges are
brought to the courts.
2. The Housing Element.
The mandatory requirements of the housing element 1 25 are considerably less detailed than the requirements for the open space
element. Although terse, the statutory requirement is of enormous
consequence: "[The housing element] shall make adequate provisions for the housing needs of all economic segments of the com1 26
munity.
This statutory command is supplemented by guidelines promulgated by the California Housing and Community Development
Commission, which have been incorporated into the Council on
Intergovernmental Relations' General Plan Guidelines. 27

These

123. CoalitionConclusion of Law Nos. 27 and 30.
124. San Mateo Co. Super. Ct. No. 185-D14 (May 20, 1975) (City's open
space plan ruled inadequate). See also City of Oakland v. City of Alameda,
Alameda Co. Super. Ct. No. 450083-0 (Aug. 13, 1974) (City's general plan
ruled inadequate, especially as to failure to consider and plan for effect of
Oakland Airport).
125. CAL. Gov. CODE § 65302(e) (West Supp. 1976).
126. CAL. Gov. CODE § 65302(c) (West Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
The statutory language previously reading that the local jurisdiction shall
"endeavor to" make adequate provision for such housing was considerably
tightened in 1971 by making this duty explicitly mandatory. (Cal. Stats.
1971, ch. 1803.) (Old language can be found in Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 1355,
P 291.)
1 127. Although these guidelines of the Housing and Community Development Commission ("HCDC") were termed "regulations" by the 1971
Amendments to Gov. Code § 65302(c), the 1972 provisions of Cal. Gov't
Code § 43211.1 (West Supp. 1976) provide that the Council on Intergovernmental Relations shall use its guidelines for general plan preparation by
local governments whatever the HCDC "guidelines" are. Moreover, the
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guidelines require a thorough survey of housing needs and the
development of goals, policies and specific action programs to
achieve the statutory objectives. 128 The provisions of California
Government Code Section 65008 also seem to require affirmative
action plans by local governmental entities for providing low in129
come housing.
The basic California statutory provisions aim at the very same
concept elaborated as a constitutional requirement by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel.13 0 There, the court held that, under
the equal protection, substantive due process and general welfare
provisions of the New Jersey Constitution, each municipality has
an affirmative duty, by its land use regulations, to "make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing," and
"must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of
the municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional
need [for low and moderate income housing].""13
The court
further held that these obligations must be met unless the municipality could sustain the "heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar
circumstances which dictate that it should not be required so to
do."'

5 2

The Mount Laurel decision establishes a benchmark by which
other state high courts will be measuring their own low and moderHCDC guidelines have apparently never been officially promulgated' as
"regulations" pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally
C. F. Knight, "California Planning Law: Requirements For Low and Moderate Income Housing," 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. S159, at S162-64 (1974). The
California Court of Appeal recently decided in an unpublished opinion that

the HCDC guidelines as to the housing element preparation are purely advisory. (Leonard v. City of El Cerrito, 1 Civil 34762 (filed Oct. 13, 1975).)
128. See Council on Intergovernmental Relations, General Plan Guidelines (Sept. 20, 1973).
129. See C.F. Knight, supra, note 127, at S160-S161.
130. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).

131. Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. The Court held that the "fair share".
of the regional need included a share both of those residing within the municipality, and of those presently and reasonably to be expected to be employed within the municipality. Id. 187-89, 336 A.2d at 731-32.

132. 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25. The Court rejected several de-

fenses that the municipality offered:

(1) lack of intent to discriminate

against persons of low income, (2) that all or most municipalities were doing the same or worse as Mount Laurel, (3) that local fiscal reasons dictated
the municipality seek out the "good" tax rateables to industry and commerce, while discouraging the housing of low income persons with many
children, (4) that environmental reasons dictated discouraging development
of all sorts in the municipality, and (5) that low income housing probably
could not be provided without some sort of public subsidy.
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ate income housing planning and requirements. 133 The issue is
currently being raised in California in Orange County Fair Housing Council v. City of Irvine.3 4 There, the plaintiffs urge that the
City of Irvine has no housing which persons of low income can
afford, while its zoning provides for huge industrial developments
which will employ large numbers of low income persons unable to
afford to live in the community. Such a policy, it is argued,
violates the Mount Laurel principle as it is embodied in California's statutory planning requirements. The Irvine case is probably
only the first among many California cases raising these issues.
3. The Consistency Requirement.
California is not the first state in which the courts have been
confronted with cases arising from the failure of local planners to
comply with the duty under the consistency requirement 3 5 to make
zoning comply with the local general plan. In Dalton v. City and
County of Honolulu,"36 the Hawaii Supreme Court construed a
similar consistency requirement imposed by the Honolulu city charter. According to the charter, the local general plan was to "set
forth the long-range, comprehensive physical development of the
city." The consistency requirement was imposed by the charter's
provision that "no .

.

. zoning ordinance shall be ...

adopted

unless it conforms to and implements the general plan." The
purpose of the requirement that a general plan be prepared, the
court said, "was to prevent the deterioration of our environment by
forcing the city to articulate long-range comprehensive planning
goals," while the purpose of the consistency requirement "was to
prevent the compromise of these planning goals." According to
133. See e.g., Township of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, 341 A.2d 466
(Pa. S. Ct., 1975) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopts "fair share" low
and moderate income housing obligations). In a recent speech, Mr. Justice
Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court (who has written most of
the Court's land use decisions of recent years) has discussed the principle
behind the Mount Laurel case in somewhat glowing terms. See Speech to
Conference on Bay Area Urban Growth (San Francisco, Oct. 2, 1975). The
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law is presently circulating a
proposal to raise funds for litigating the "Mount Laurel Cause of action"
in four major state courts, including California.
134. Orange Co. Super. Ct. No. 225,824 (filed Mar. 7, 1975).
135. See discussion supra.
136. 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P.2d 199 (1969).
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the court, "These provisions allow less room for the exertion of
pressure by powerful individuals and institutions.' 11 7 The court
explained that the consistency requirement:
[A]ttempts to avoid the danger that zoning, considered as a selfcontained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may
tyrannize individual property owners. Haar, 'In Accordance with
a Comprehensive Plan,' 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 at 1158 (1955).
It puts teeth into the requirement that the general plan be 'longrange' by providing a test for courts to use in reviewing zoning
ordinances, i.e., if a zoning ordinance does not 'conform to and
implement' the general plan, then the city did not have the power
to adopt it.138
The Hawaii general plan had designated the areas in question as
appropriate for limited residential and agricultural uses only. The
defendants wished to rezone the parcels for a more intensive usemedium-density apartments. Regarding the inconsistency between
the plan and the proposed rezoning, the court stated:
In the context of the present case [the consistency requirement]
would have prevented the city from adopting [the two protested
rezoning ordinances] without first amending the general plan,
ordinances] do not conform to the unamended
since clearly 13[those
general plan. 9
The Honolulu officials tried to avoid the consistency requirement by first amending the plan. Thus, parallel public hearings
were held; and, in a two-step process, the plan was first amended
and then the new zoning was adopted. Even this attempt to
technically comply with the law did not satisfy the court.
To allow the city to amend the general plan (under its general
power to amend ordinances) and then adopt a zoning ordinance
contrary to the unamended general plan, is to allow the city to
by two ordinances exactly what the charter sought to
accomplish
prohibit. 140
The court ruled that such "piecemeal" amendments to the general
plan would "subvert and destroy" the purposes of the legislation
and the general plan itself.1 4 1 If the city wished to amend its plan,
it was required to undertake a "comprehensive" rather than piecemeal updating of the plan, including appropriate studies and investigation to determine, inter alia,whether the initial plan had underestimated housing needs, whether more apartments were the
solution to any such housing shortage and whether the area in
question was most suited for such apartments or whether some
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 416, 462 P.2d at 208-09 (1969).
at 413, 462 P.2d at 207 (1969).
at 414, 462 P.2d at 208 (1969).
at 416, 462 P.2d at 209 (1969).
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other area was preferable. 142 In other words, the court required
something very much like an EIR justifying the decision to amend
the plan in this manner and demonstrating that the amendment
itself was consistent with the overall declared goals and policies set
forth in the plan.
Other state courts have also required that local zoning be consistent with the general plan. In Palazzi v. State,' 43 for example,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that inconsistent zoning
was invalid and explained that the consistency requirement was
designed to "avoid an arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious exercise of the zoning power that would result in haphazard or piece1 44
meal zoning."'
In California, the legislature clearly contemplated that the consistency requirement imposed by AB 1301 would be subject to
judicial enforcement. Thus, Section 65860(b) of the California
Government Code gives standing to any resident in the local
jurisdiction to enforce these provisions, while Section 65860(a)
defines "consistency" to mean that "the various land uses authorized by the zoning ordinance are compatible with the objectives,
policies, general land uses and programs specified [in the general
plan."] .145

Once again, the Coalition decision apparently represents the first
judicial decision in California nullifying a zoning program as being
142. Id. In California, under CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65351, the general plan
cannot be amended more frequently than three times a year, and zone
changes and plan amendments cannot be the subject of simultaneous public
hearings.
143. 319 A.2d 658 (R.I. 1974).

144. Id. at 663.

See also Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 228 N.Y.S.2d 888,

235 N.E.2d 897 (1968) (zoning must not conflict with comprehensive plan).
Cf. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291 (1972) (duty to implement general plan through zoning regulations);
Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (zoning

is quasi-adjudicatory act); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. D.C.
884, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (same). See generally, Note, Comprehensive Land
Use Plans and the Consistency Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 766 (1974);
Comment, Zoning Shall Be Consistent with the General Plan-A Help or a
Hindranceto Planning?, 10 SAN DiEo L. REv. 901 (1973); Comment, Looking Back: Consistency in Interpretationof and Response to the Consistency
Requirement, A.B. 1301, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV., S196 (1974).
145. The California Attorney General has opined that the zoning program
must further, and not undercut, the "policies and designations" established

in the general plan. 58 Ops. Calif. Atty. Gen. 21 (1975).
S133

inconsistent with a local general plan. 1 46 In Coalition, the court
found three specific violations of AB 1301 and the consistency
requirement:
(1) The County had prepared the plan maps so that they would,
in essence, conform to pre-existing zoning, rather than revising
the
zoning to bring it into conformity with a comprehensive plan;147
(2) The County's open space zoning and regulatory program was
inconsistent with the plan's textual policies relating to open
148
space;
(3) The County's plan was internally inconsistent; certain textual
elements conflicted with other textual elements,
while the entire
149
set of plan maps conflicted with the plan's text.
146. In Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. City Council of Los
Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 3d 825, 118 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1974), the Court of Appeal
invalidated a subdivision map approval because the local jurisdiction failed
to make the proper finding that such approval was consistent with the appropriate local general plan.
147. See discussion, supra.
148. Coalition Conclusion of Law No. 23. The court characterized as
"numerous" the inconsistencies between the regulatory program and the

general plan text, citing the following "substantial" conflicts as specific examples:
(a) the non-agricultural uses permitted in all lands presently
in agricultural uses are inconsistent with the stated textual policy
to preserve agriculture where appropriate;
(b) medium-to-high density and high density zoning employed
throughout the Resource Management Area including the designation of virtually all the land along the Malibu Coast for U3 and
U4 (medium and medium-high residential density) with some C
(major commercial) is directly inconsistent with the policies and
designations set forth for the Resource Management Area including
the declared goal of restoring and preserving natural resources in
those areas and the stated policy of preserving the Malibu Coastline as a scenic resource;
(c) the provisions for residential development at the densities
permitted within the 'significant ecological areas' depicted in the
plan including the designation of ten (10) percent of the 'signifi-

cant ecological areas' in the Santa Monica Mountains and twenty
(20) percent in the San Jose and Puente Hills for urban (not even
rural) uses, are inconsistent with the stated policies and designations to preserve significant ecological areas;
(d) the designation of the additional 178 square miles of urban
expansion in areas where there is fully a 99 percent conflict with
natural resource factors is inconsistent with the stated policies of
protecting natural resource areas, wildlife and vegetation areas,
and watershed and conservation areas; and
(e) the broad brush provisions permitting residential uses up
to one dwelling unit per two acres throughout the entire Rural I
(or Watershed Conservation Area) without further provisions to
protect the widely varying natural resources in those areas from
different dangers to them are inconsistent with the stated policies

of protecting the natural resources in these areas."
Finding of Fact No. 33.)

149. Coalition Conclusion of Law No. 27.

(Coalition

In addition to the inconsist-

encies cited, supra, note 148, the court found other basic inconsistencies:

The addition of 178 square miles of urban expansion by the 1990
Land Use Maps of the 1973 General Plan over and above the 173
square miles of urban expansion provided by the Guide, when the
1990 population projection for the County in 1973 was 1.5 million

S134

Control Over the City Plan

[VOL. 3: S106, 1976]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

These inconsistencies were, of course, the inevitable result of the
County's attempt to make its general plan maps conform to preexisting (and excess capacity) zoning and its attempt to retain
basic textual policies of the pre-existing 1970 plan. Although the
Coalitioncourt announced that its review over these inconsistencies
would be "limited,"' 50 the contradictory nature of the County's
plan was so marked that the court voided the entire plan and
regulatory program. The County is now well underway in its
attempt to comply with the court's mandate to prepare a new plan
and regulatory program which does not share these deficiencies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Council on Intergovernmental Relations' General Plan
Guidelines expressly recognizes (perhaps with understatement)
that: "To meet court tests, general plans need to be clearly written,
tightly structured, internally consistent documents." 151 The Coalition decision and others like it now being brought are designed to
uphold the integrity of the local land use planning process. They
protect our cities and our citizens from the abuses tolerated and
even encouraged by previous judicial reluctance to exercise any
review in this area. Courts are far from becoming planning and
zoning appeal boards. But they are increasingly aware of the
potential for abuse and, with the new policies and procedures
established by state legislators, they are commencing an exciting
and necessary journey into a new legal terrain.

persons less than predicted in 1970, and the 1973 General Plan's
tremendous 'overage factor' of 1500 percent, were in themselves
inconsistent with the 'modified centers' urban development policy
encompassed in the Guide, and purportedly followed by the 1973
General Plan, and actually followed the 'dispersion' urban development policy. The allocation of this additional urban expansion
was also inconsistent with the 1973 General Plan's adopted interim
growth policy, which incorporated the subsequently reduced 1990
population projection." (Finding of Fact No. 34.)
150. Coalition Conclusion of Law Nos. 21 and 25.
151. Council on Intergovernmental Relations, General Plan Guidelines
(Sept. 1973) at 111-2.

S135

